Democracy, Liberty and Montesquieu: Constructing Accountable Order in African Conflict States by Leonard, David K.
1 Introduction
The path out of intra-state violent conflict used
to be ‘simple’ – fighting continued until one
party won or a stalemate produced a compromise
settlement, so that the way to reconstruction was
embedded in the concluding peace. However,
such ‘simplicity’ was based on letting a conflict
first run its course, and thus purchased at the
cost of prolonged violence and loss of human life
and wellbeing. Fortunately, since the end of the
Cold War the international community has made
the process more ‘complicated’ in Africa by
bringing such violence to a ‘premature’ pause.
Other states, generally under the auspices of the
United Nations or the African Union, now are
likely to intervene with peacekeeping forces to
stop the fighting and will provide aid with
political reconstruction. Such ‘new generation’
peace efforts have been among the factors
reducing violent conflict in Africa since its high-
point in the early 1990s (Straus 2012). This
mitigation of violence has been a great benefit
for human welfare but the newness and
complication of the subsequent steps has made
‘the best way’ to rebuilding order unclear. In this
article I wish to explore whether we might do a
better job by broadening and reprioritising the
terms of reference for reconstruction.
Until recently most post-conflict effort in Tropical
Africa has followed the path of: (1) an agreement
on an interim coalition government between the
leaders of the contending forces, (2) Disarmament,
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of the
contending armed forces, (3) an election after a
defined interval to confirm and legitimate a new
government, and (4) the rebuilding of central
state capacity, including some degree of Security
Sector Reform (SSR). It is now evident that this
model was insufficient, for we have seen some of
the conflicts reignite after an initial period of
peace and in most of the others the
reconstruction process has dragged on much
longer than expected (Collier 2009).
The articles in this IDS Bulletin on Côte d’Ivoire
by Allouche and Zadi Zadi and on the South Kivu
Province of Congo by Mushi make it clear that
one part of what needs to be added to the
reconstruction agenda is (5) patient mediation
and resolution of the local conflicts that help to
fuel the civil wars and which generally remain
when the elite-level bargains are struck at the
national level. This point is made as well by
Autesserre (2010). 
Similarly the articles by Vincent on Sierra Leone,
Mushi on Congo, Samantar and Leonard on
Somalia (see also Leonard and Samantar 2011),
as well as the second, Overview article by myself
in this IDS Bulletin all make the point that (6) as
there is a double social contract between citizens
and their communities and between
communities and the state, the reconstruction of
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a legitimate (even if reformed) local government
and of its relationship with the centre also are an
equally high priority after a civil war.
Finally, I wish to add in this article that (7) none
of the foregoing steps will work properly unless
the various powers in the reconstituted state
check and balance each other, to produce what
Montesquieu called ‘liberty’. Such a step toward a
‘moderated’ and more liberal state needs to
accompany or even precede democratic elections
(3 above). Similarly restoring local order (5 and 6)
is facilitated by Montesquieu’s liberty. To make
this argument I first will outline the social context
within which democracy and governance are
conducted in contemporary Africa. Second, I wish
to review the debates about whether democracy is
appropriate in a post-conflict situation. I then will
discuss insights from Montesquieu, who argues for
‘liberty’ and a ‘moderate[d]’ state. In this last step
we will be returning to the classical political
theories of the era in which the modern
democratic state was created in western Europe.
The second, Overview article in this IDS Bulletin
examined the social contract theorists of this era
(as was done even more thoroughly in Leonard
and Samantar 2011). Montesquieu took a
different ‘cut’ on the challenges of royal
absolutism, but his work came between the social
contract contributions of Hobbes and Locke, on
the one hand, and that of Rousseau, on the other.
His Spirit of the Laws (1949) was highly influential
in shaping the constitution of the USA (Madison
et al. 1992 [1788]) and in the early stages of the
French Revolution. 
2 Elections and conflict
2.1 A dual purpose
Ideally, democracy should serve two functions in
society – representation and conflict resolution.1
The most prominent of these and the one that
has received the great bulk of scholarly and
policy attention has been the first – a mechanism
for making government responsive to the
expressed interests of the population it serves.
But democracy can and does play another role as
well – providing an alternative to violent conflict
as a means of determining who will rule the
state, a mechanism that can become routinised
in a society and is less costly to human life and
economic growth (Straus 2012). 
Elections are not straightforward as tools for
conflict resolution, however. They provide a
specific time and contest at which the composition
of government is to be determined. As a result –
unless they are very well managed – the social
forces underlying a country’s most important
conflicts are likely to be mobilised to ‘fight’ the
election (note the word). In this way an election
can bring to a head the very conflict it is supposed
to sort out and thus itself produce violence, even
if in a diminished form (Straus 2012).
Recent studies by Paul Collier, Jack Snyder and
Roland Paris have demonstrated that elections in
post-conflict situations run a high risk of
reigniting the conflict they are supposed to
resolve. Given the milieu of patronage described
below, elections can create an opportunity for
political entrepreneurs to advance their careers
through extremist appeals to mobilise their
ethnic or religious group and such ‘out-bidding’
can lead to increased violence in society. So
although elections are a precipitating rather
than an underlying cause of violence in society
(a distinction made by Brown 2001), the ability
of elections to mobilise extreme opinions that
outlast the immediate contest should make us
cautious about their conduct when conflict is
already present (Mbugua 2006).
Snyder (2000) analyses cases from the 1990s to
argue that if democratisation is not to take a
disastrous turn into nationalistic conflict it must
be preceded by economic development, an
established middle-class, a professional media,
and a well-functioning state (with the rule of law
and an impartial bureaucracy). He also contends
that elites who would be displaced by elections
must have an alternative to political power that
they find acceptable if they are to surrender it
without a fight. Prior to the achievement of these
conditions he is prepared to accept a mildly
authoritarian regime that is moving toward
democracy. The bulk of his analysis derives from
developments in the former Soviet bloc, although
he also considers Rwanda to some extent. 
Paris (2004) uses a largely different set of cases
than Snyder, but he too concludes that the
introduction of democracy will dangerously
increase societal conflicts unless the institutional
preconditions for its success have been met first.
Thus he calls for Institutionalisation Before
Elections. By ‘institutionalisation’ Paris means
that an array of pro-democratic organisations,
practices, and rules should be in place and valued
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by key actors for their own sake (Selznick 1957;
Stinchcombe 1968). As Paris does not favour the
establishment of authoritarian regimes as a step
out of civil wars, in effect he is calling for an
extended period of international stewardship
over post-conflict countries, delaying the initial
election until reforms in the structures critical to
successful democracy are in place and extending
supervision for some time afterwards while they
gain acceptance. Most of the elements Paris
prescribes became standard objectives for United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) post-
conflict election missions in the twenty-first
century (Leonard 2009a; UNDP 2009), save that
he would not proceed with elections without
evidence that ‘moderate’ political parties would
prevail over those promoting inter-group
conflict. Bastian and Luckham (2003), also
working from case studies, lend support to this
last precondition. 
Collier shares the concern of Snyder and Paris
that the international community has been too
anxious to see elections as a panacea for conflict
resolution and has been too quick to exit conflict
states after the vote has been conducted.
However his major concern – backed by cross-
national econometric evidence – is to persuade
donors that post-conflict reconstruction is a
lengthy process, requiring at least a decade of
sustained effort and assistance (Collier 2007).
2.2 Sequencing or gradualism in democratisation?
Should preparation for democracy be consigned
to a non-democratic ‘care-taker’ out of concern
over domestic conflict? As Carothers (2007)
remarks, ‘the record of democratic change since
the “third wave” began in 1974 reveals few
successful cases of “controlled reforms” leading
to democracy’. His point is reinforced for Africa
by the constitutional history of Uganda under
President Museveni, who insisted that in order to
avoid democracy’s causing the re-eruption of
ethnic conflict, there would have to be a period
of controlled transition under his guidance – but
who in fact has perpetuated his own brand of
enlightened authoritarianism for two decades
and fought a long, ethnically based civil war in
Uganda’s north as well (Griffiths and Katalikawe
2003). One could take an even older historical
sweep and note that most of the world’s
democracies emerged first in periods of civil
disorder, not smooth institution-building or
careful preparation by authoritarian rulers.
This is not to deny the importance of a suite of
institutions and social conditions supporting a
democratic society, nor is it to argue for forcing
elections on a society that doesn’t seem to be
asking for them. In Africa, however, the demand
for democracy is very high. It enjoys majority
levels of popular support in almost all African
countries and military regimes are never
preferred (Bratton 2007). Very often combatants
demand elections as a condition for stopping
fighting (e.g. Burundi, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Liberia, Republic of South Africa,
Sierra Leone). In contemporary Africa most
often there really isn’t a choice about whether or
not to hold an election. In fact elections are held
regularly and manipulated vigorously precisely
because they confer a form of legitimacy on
executive and legislative authority. Thus in
Nigeria it matters to people that their presidents
and governors are elected and are not simply
appointees of an informal committee of generals.
Military authority is widely seen as having failed
in Africa and even the military most often wants
to see a civilian approbation of leadership, the
selection of which it may have influenced.
It is in contexts where elections are difficult but
nonetheless popular and necessary that the
distinction between ‘sequencing’ and
‘gradualism’ is useful. Carothers (2007) writes,
Sequencing is about putting off democracy –
especially open, competitive elections – until
some time in the indefinite future while
pursuing state-building and the rule of the law
in the meantime. Gradualism is different. It is
based on the recognition that authoritarian
rule is itself usually a key obstacle to building a
well-functioning state and establishing the rule
of law. The gradualist approach seeks to find a
way for countries where few circumstances
favor democratization to take incremental but
definite steps toward open political
competition while simultaneously pursuing state-
building and rule-of-law reforms. 
Lindberg’s work adds support to this tack. His
cross-national econometrics suggest that
elections in Africa become more democratic the
more often they are repeated, even if they are
not conducted auspiciously at the start (Lindberg
2006; 2009). When an election is held it sets in
process a series of societal changes in
organisations (e.g. the rejuvenation of parties),
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behaviour (e.g. politicians who are looking
toward electorates when making policy
decisions) and attitudes (e.g. citizens who come
to expect contested elections) that build
momentum toward still further democracy. This
finding is reinforced by that of Robert Bates
(2008), who finds that in Africa the prospects of
militias challenging state order is decreased by
elections.2 Nonetheless, it is true that both the
Lindberg and Bates findings are averages, may be
more true in Africa and Eastern Europe than
elsewhere, and are not something that is
automatically assured (Lindberg 2009). The
democratising and conflict-reduction effects of
elections also have been achieved in Africa
through ongoing domestic and international
pressure – and probably the realisation by
current power-holders that their interests will be
adequately served with less severely anti-
democratic measures (Heilbrunn 2007).
Bastian and Luckham (2003) insist that there is no
universal design template for democratisation –
history matters, as does the process of institution-
building and the actions of the political actors
involved. But the choices are not just (a) quick
elections, no institution-building and rapid
international exit vs (b) no elections, institution-
building and continued international involvement.
The options are much more complex than that –
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where so many
states are donor-dependent and international
involvement in elections has come to be accepted
(and is even a part of African Union expectations). 
Although it is true that the process of regaining
stability after a conflict is sure to be lengthy (and it
is false to expect that those in the international
community who have intervened to bring the
fighting to a close will be able to exit quickly after
an election), the demands of African citizens and
the dynamics of negotiating the end to civil wars
make gradual progress toward elections a frequent
necessity. The question is not whether to hold
elections but how can the international community
help conflict-prone societies hold elections that
avoid violence and promote peaceful conflict
resolution, despite the acknowledged difficulties? 
3 The social milieu of contemporary African
democracy
3.1 A context of patronage
Throughout Africa (and, indeed, in many other
developing countries) voting is largely determined
by ethnicity, kinship and neighbourhood.3 In rural
areas, where all three tend to coincide, the result
is that voting at the polling-station level will
generally be in favour of one particular candidate,
with the decision effectively being a collective one,
sometimes enforced by implicit coercion. For
example, Barkan et al. (2006) found in Kenya that
the average vote for the winning candidate for
parliament in 1997 was 65 per cent, even though
there was an average of 4.4 candidates. At polling
station level this pattern of local consensus would
be even more obvious. (Only in the major urban
areas is the coincidence of family and
neighbourhood broken. Although kinship and
rural ties will still be influential for all but second-
generation urban elites, adherence to them will
not be as noticeable in city polling stations.) 
This ascriptive voting behaviour is neither
atavistic nor irrational. African states provide no
reliable, formal systems of social security and
individuals can rely only on their kin and
neighbours for assistance. This not only
strengthens the ties of ascriptive solidarity but
also makes it rational for one to want state
benefits to reach members of one’s own social
group, even if one does not get them oneself – for
those who receive them might then be in a
position to help in the future.
Not only does the above social dynamic lead
voters to seek out patronage goods for their
communities, it also makes it relatively easy for
political candidates to see whether the
community around a particular polling station
has been faithful to its part of the clientage
bargain and has delivered – en masse – the
expected votes. Visibility, and hence
enforceability, make patron–client relations
efficient and even more attractive (Kitshelt and
Wilkenson 2007). Thus, even if achievement-
oriented, policy-based political competition
might produce better results for the country as a
whole, the individual politician, community and
voter will find patron–client political ties
rational. 
Politicians who fail to provide jobs, infrastructure
and other elements of patronage will disappoint
their electorate and be vulnerable to challenge in
the next election – either from the opposition
(most often in an urban area) or another faction
of the party (in most of the countryside). The
temptation to be corrupt and profligate with the
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public purse in order to gain patronage for
personally targeted distribution (with some
personal wealth on the side) is overwhelming.
Of course an elected office holder could (and
should) provide constituency service without
being corrupt. Constituency service is a benefit
provided to all individuals of a certain place or
category, regardless of their personal votes.
Patronage, on the other hand, is visibly targeted
only to those who are supporting the politician,
so that the benefit is a reward for political
backing.4 The boundaries between constituency
service and patronage overlap, but the end points
of the continuum they describe are clearly
different. Patronage is politically more efficient
than constituency service and is much more
prone to corruption. 
3.2 Strong presidents
African states are weak in the face of very strong
societies (Migdal 1988). As Aristide Zolberg
noted 40 years ago, this makes nervous national
politicians construct governmental systems that
are as strong as possible – hence the long period
of one-party rule on the continent and the
persistence even today of very strong presidencies
(Zolberg 1966). 
The resulting problem is that the stakes for
winning or losing the presidency become
inordinately high. A key dimension of the
violence that frequently surrounds presidential
elections in Africa is the extreme concentration
of authority in the presidency. Such unchecked
power is often described as an ‘imperial
presidency’. It parallels the ‘royal absolutism’ of
early modern Europe, which Napoleon was able
to reproduce by replacing ‘the divine right of
kings’ with plebiscitary democracy. We will see
that the resulting threat to liberty is precisely
the problem Montesquieu addresses.
Post-conflict states are even weaker in facing
strong societies than they were at independence.
The temptation of domestic and international
leaders alike then is to assist in rebuilding a
strong presidency with security and civil services
that are wholly responsive to its direction. But
the conflicts from which these states are
escaping generally were exacerbated, if not
caused, by precisely such ‘imperial presidents’
and the reconstruction of durable peace is made
harder by their recreation.
3.3 Parliaments of rural ambassadors
When patron–clientage is combined with a
strong presidency the legislature becomes a
collection of (largely rural) ambassadors
petitioning for patronage goods they can
distribute to their constituencies (or turn into
personal wealth for themselves, which, in turn,
can be used to make them generous ‘big men’ at
home). For Members of Parliament who operate
in these circumstances, deliberating on public
policy, passing laws, and holding government
accountable, are minor activities when seen from
the point of view of re-election. To some extent
the same can be said of first-past-the-post
constituency legislators everywhere. But the
strength of society and the presidency in Africa
makes the tendency much stronger.
It is difficult in most of Africa to produce
competitive political parties based on public
policy differences rather than the distribution of
patronage – at least until the issues around
service provision shift from their physical
presence in particular constituencies to their
general quality and until income from oil or
international aid is no longer the most important
source of income for the elite. 
4 Montesquieu and liberty
When the usual answer to a question is
unsuccessful and the alternatives are confused,
the difficulty often is that the problem is being
misconceived – that the question needs to be
posed in a different way. To do so, I think it is
useful to ask how Montesquieu5 would have
looked at and analysed the problems of post-
conflict reconstruction and the violence often
provoked by multiparty elections. He saw the
basic challenge of his era not as one of
‘democracy’ but instead of ‘liberty’. By this he
meant that the fundamental problem was one of
ever-increasing absolutism, which he saw as a
threat to ‘liberty’ as he understood it.
Of course Montesquieu never recommended
principles of government for sub-Saharan Africa.
Although he had the largest private library in
Europe of his epoch,6 it is very unlikely that he
had even a single book on the region. But over
the course of the last 30 years the world has
debated the best means of improving governance
in Africa. The regimes most often prescribed
include democracy and free markets.
Montesquieu was the greatest eighteenth
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century French advocate against mercantilism
and for the free market.7 More important, his
ideas on the ideal form of government were
based on the then current practice in England
and had a great influence on the constitutions
adopted by France and the USA after their
revolutions. These three states are the most
frequent model for new democracies in Africa
and Montesquieu himself invites the reader to
apply his ideas beyond the cases he analysed
(Montesquieu 1995 [1748], 1949 Bk. XI, Chap.
20.) One could well argue that Montesquieu is
partly responsible for causing ‘liberal democracy’
to be ‘liberal’.
‘Democracy’ is not necessarily ‘liberal’. Greek
democracy was rooted in the community and had
no conception of individual rights that could
stand against the collective. Rousseau gave the
community and its ‘general will’ much more
emphasis than Hobbes and Locke, who had
focused on individuals and their rights. Thus
Rousseau was the social contract theorist who
was used most often in support of plebiscitary
democracy and the imposition of ‘social rights’
over ‘individual liberties’. One might think then
that liberal democracy is ill-suited to Africa, for
we argued in the second, Overview article in this
IDS Bulletin that the primary social contract in
Africa is between the individual and his or her
community and that the social contract with the
state is mediated by the community one. Unlike
ancient Greece or Rousseau’s Geneva, however,
the community and the state are not one in
Africa (Parekh 1993). The ‘liberal’ principle that
subordinates have rights and liberties which
deserve protection through checks on the state in
practice serves the multi-ethnic and multi-
religious communities of Africa better than the
collectivist, plebiscitary ideals of independence-
era African nationalism did. Hence
Montesquieu’s thought and liberal democracy are
relevant to contemporary Africa, despite their
origins in a quite different cultural milieu. 
4.1 Montesquieu’s understanding of liberty
It might be thought ironic that Montesquieu is
considered one of the founding philosophers of
democracy, for he saw an elected assembly as
only one component in the reform of monarchy.
For Montesquieu the most valuable principle was
‘liberty’. (Note that the French Revolution was
conducted in the name of ‘liberty, equality and
fraternity’, not ‘democracy’.) 
In De L’Esprit des Lois [The Spirit of the Laws]
Montesquieu  speaks of two forms of liberty –
constitutional and individual. Both are construed
in legal terms. Of the constitutional, he writes,
Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws
permit, and if a citizen could do what they
forbid he would be no longer possessed of
liberty, because all his fellow-citizens would
have the same power [XI, 3]… Political
liberty is to be found only in moderate[d]
governments; and even in those it is not
always found. It is there only when there is no
abuse of power. But constant experience
shows us that every man invested with power
is apt to abuse it… To prevent this abuse, it is
necessary from the very nature of things that
power should be a check to power [XI, 4]
(Montesquieu 1995 [1748]).
On individual liberty, he says,
It is not sufficient to have treated political
liberty in relation to the constitution; we must
examine it likewise in the relation it bears to
the [citizen] subject [XII, 1]… Political liberty
consists in security… This security is never
more dangerously attacked than in public or
private accusations. It is therefore on the
goodness of criminal laws that the liberty of
the [citizen] subject principally depends…
When the subject has no fence to secure his
innocence, he has none for his liberty [XII, 2]
(ibid.).
Montesquieu’s personal experience had made him
very sensitive to the abuse of power of the French
monarchy. He was a presiding judge in his region
– président à moriter du Parlement de Bordeaux – and
hence a guardian of the law. The various parlements
of France were aristocratic regional courts and
often were in conflict with the ministers of the
king, hence his view that the powers of the king
ought to be moderated by the powers of judges
such as himself. Further, his wife came from a
Calvinist family; thus he thought that one should
be imprisoned only for acts, not for one’s beliefs or
the expression of one’s thoughts, i.e. that one
should have liberty of religion and speech. Finally,
Montesquieu’s estates produced wine and he had
an active interest in its sale and export. Hence he
understood well the damage done to commerce by
an arbitrary and rapacious executive. He worried
less about whether a government was a monarchy
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or a democracy than that it did not become
despotic. Above all he wanted government that
was moderate[d] and subject to law. 
4.2 New possibilities for liberty in Africa
From the above analysis one can see that
Montesquieu would say that contemporary
African states are despotic and that they suffer
the consequences of a lack of liberty. In addition
Montesquieu would recommend that the
problem of liberty weighs more heavily than that
of democracy – what would one gain if the
president were freely elected but despotic? It is
more important that the powers of presidents be
moderated, he would say. And if there is a state
with constitutional liberty that violates the rights
of man and thus deprives citizens of individual
liberty, one would not gain much, in his view. For
life is not good if it lacks ‘“security”, protection
against false criminal accusations that could
gravely threaten physical liberty, one’s property,
honour or even one’s life’ (Gressaye 1955).
Thus Montesquieu clearly would recommend
‘moderate’ governments for Africa. He would
highlight the conflicts and dysfunctions that
absolutist ‘imperial presidents’ have created on
the continent (just as they did in the Europe of
his era) and would strongly argue against a
neglect of liberty in the reconstruction of order or
democracy in post-conflict states. By ‘moderate’
he is not speaking in The Spirit of the Laws of a
conservative regime but of one in which each
power is ‘moderated’ by the check of another
power [XI, 4]. This idea is not completely original
to Montesquieu; he himself cites classical and
humanist writers on the experience of the Roman
Republic with a mixed government [XI, 12–19].
Cicero and the other classical authorities had not
discussed this practice from the point of view of
one power checking another. But Machiavelli
gave them that interpretation in his Discours and
we know that Montesquieu had read this
controversial author (even if he was wise enough
not to cite him) (Skinner 2000).
The closest thing to an African president in a
one-party state is a king. Montesquieu believed
that monarchy could be limited by several paths
– by religion and the principle of honour (i.e. by
one of the fundamental interests of the
aristocracy) [III, 10] or by a popularly elected
legislature and an aristocratic judiciary (as in
England and the Roman Republic) [VIII].
As Montesquieu recognised in his treatment of
the Roman army, however, a power will not be
limited unless it is stopped by another
substantive (rather than just constitutional)
power [XI, 17]. When the first constitutions were
written for the newly independent African states
in the 1960s, an attempt was made to create
checks on the executive by the legislature, the
judiciary and local governments. But colonial
practice had been completely centralised on the
executive and the other institutions that then
were newly expected to check it had little real
power.8 For example, the independence
constitution of Kenya stipulated that there would
be strong regional governments, but when the
extremely popular President Kenyatta ordered
the civil service to obey his orders and not those
of the regional governments, all submitted.
Thus it is important to ask, ‘Are there now
alternative institutions in contemporary Africa
that have sufficient real power to challenge a
president if they are granted constitutional
authority to do so?’ Let us start by enumerating
the several countervailing forces that can
challenge absolutism today:
i In observing the democratisation movements
in Africa since 1990 one sees that attorneys
and religious leaders played a very prominent
role. The ideology of most of the new states
has been secular and thus it is not easy to give
constitutionally ‘established’ positions to the
clergy or budgetary support to the core
functions of the churches. But precisely this
lack of state finance has made it difficult to
co-opt the clergy, and their power with their
followers continues to grow. In the same
manner most attorneys earn their living
outside the state, representing their clients
against other private citizens and firms or
against the state itself. Thus their revenues
also are independent of the state and it is
hard for a president to co-opt the legal
profession as a whole. Plus attorneys have
knowledge of the law and thus possess an
important tool in challenging the state.
ii African civil society is no longer the same as it
was 50 years ago at independence. The
imposition of structural reforms on African
economies in the 1980s and 1990s reduced the
impact of the state on businessmen, and the
finance donors have continued to provide to
indigenous non-governmental organisations
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(NGOs) also have created a new space in
which local elites can secure their welfare
without dependence on government.
iii At independence most analysts had seen trade
unions as powerful. But there was too much
unemployment and it was easy for the first
generation of African presidents to break
their strikes and co-opt their leaders with
government positions. The unions remain
weak but due to the collapse of state revenues
their leaders are not receiving the same
patronage as they once enjoyed. Thus trade
unions are a bit more of a check on presidents
than they had been.
iv Regional political leaders have always been
strong in Africa. Except in the cities, African
ethnic groups have had a territorial base, so
that the power of geography and ethnicity are
unified. At the time of independence the
greatest fear of presidents was that their
countries could be dismembered, so that they
devoted great energy to co-opting and
undermining regional political leaders.
However, most secessionist movements in
Africa have failed and those that have shown
success, such as South Sudan, Somaliland and
now Northern Mali, have done so precisely
because of central antagonism to their
regional needs. Legitimate regional
governments are not quite as threatening as
they once were and Nigeria, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Kenya have
embraced them as a partial solution to
domestic violent conflict. These regional
governments today have the ability to offer a
check on ‘imperial presidents’ if their
authority is constitutionally recognised.
v More broadly, the plurality of ethnic groups,
underpinned by primary social contracts at
the community level, has the potential to offer
not only order but also a check on ‘imperial
presidents’.
vi Finally and obviously there is the army, for
Africa has experienced multiple coups d’etat
in the 50+ years since independence (even if
their frequency and legitimacy has now
diminished somewhat). Montesquieu wrote
that ‘An elected monarchy, like that of Rome,
necessarily supposes a powerful aristocratic
body to support it, without which it changes
immediately into a tyranny…’ [XI, 13]. In
other words, the army must not be just an
extension of the executive or an alternative to
it, but serve as a check on it and have its own
values as well. But just as Rome was turned
from a democratic into an imperial state when
its army officers became the source of
executive power rather than a check on it, so
coups d’etat in Africa produced tyranny.
Without coups, however, African army officers
are the equivalent of the medieval nobility in
contemporary Africa. In addition over the last
decade they and their troops have been
trained for and engaged in international
peacekeeping missions. Thus they not only
have the power to check the executive but new
socialisation in protecting human rights.
All this suggests that there are some sources of
real power that are beyond the full control of
contemporary African presidents. How might
they be institutionalised and given greater
constitutional and legal leverage? If one were to
create in each country a senate whose members
were elected by professions, churches, business
and civic associations, regional assemblies, and
the officers and enlisted men and women in the
security services, it is quite possible that they
would be able to provide the kind of check that
the House of Lords played in England at the
time of Montesquieu. In the democratic
movement of the 1990s in Francophone Africa,
there was much use of the institution of a
‘national convention’ (copied from the French
Revolution) – an institution of elites chosen by
each civil society association (and not by citizens
at large). A senate could be built on this
foundation and on the high esteem that
‘intellectuals’ receive from their fellow citizens
in Africa. Such senates would be able to
challenge gross abuse of power by presidents,
even if they only had the power to block laws and
regulations (but, following the English model,
not expenses) for a year. Unlike the parallel
popularly elected national assembly, whose focus
is the proportionate representation of individual
citizens, senates would give a voice to all the
constituent groups in the system. It would help
minorities feel that they can be heard but also
would give powerful elite groups a place where
their views and demands could be seen publicly
and therefore subject to honest bargaining.
At first it might seem strange to give such
constitutional legitimation to some of the groups
I have listed above. African armed forces, for
example, have been a greater force for abuse of
power than for democratisation or liberty in the
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years since independence. But representation of
the armed forces would reflect the reality of
their power in African political systems and
there are considerable advantages that would
come from having their views and grievances out
in the open so that bargaining was facilitated.
Further, by treating the armed forces as but one
of several important social forces in a
constitutional representative body, the voice of
the other groups would be strengthened and the
legislative dialogue would moderate both the
president and the army.
To go still further on the lines suggested by
Montesquieu, one might have a committee
elected by the senators who are attorneys to
serve as the final judicial court of appeal (as is
the case in England) and also that each new
judge nominated by the president must be
confirmed by this committee (as happens in the
USA). The supervision of the judiciary by a base
outside the immediate influence of the president
or the popularly elected assembly would give the
legal system much greater independence. In this
way, if the legislative role of the senate would
create a ‘moderate[d]’ government at the level of
the constitution and the government, the
surveillance of the courts by the members of the
legal profession sitting in the senate would
assure individual liberty. 
There have been promising experiments with
other constitutionally protected checks on the
government of the day. Genuinely independent
electoral commissions are widely advocated
(even if the political pressures to sway them are
often hard to resist). Similarly, Sierra Leone has
a Political Parties Registration Commission and
an Independent Media Commission. Kenya has a
Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission, a
Human Rights Commission, and a National
Cohesion and Integration Commission. None of
these have changed everything overnight. But
with the support of donors and local
professionals – both important sources of real
power independent of executive control – they
have made some encouraging inroads (Leonard
et al. 2009a, 2009b).
Finally, we can add the checks provided by
regional and local governments (including
modernised ‘traditional’ ones). Political
decentralisation (‘devolution’) rarely produces
improved service delivery for the poor (Crook
and Sverisson 2003). And ‘traditional’
institutions often are in need of significant
reform (Crook et al. 2010). When adequately
resourced, however, they lower the stakes in
national elections, provide a check on
presidential authority, and greatly assist with the
mediation and resolution of the local disputes
that so often fuel national-level conflicts. 
Of course we know from the experience of
independence that the insertion of clauses in a
constitution by itself achieves next to nothing. It
cannot create counter-powers, but it can
channel, regularise and legitimise existing ones.
The point is to give constitutional authority to
forces in civil society that have gained real
political significance in the last quarter of a
century and have interests and values that would
incline them to using that political power to
check an ‘imperial president’. The key to a
‘moderate[d]’ government and thus to liberty is
to connect constitutional checks and balances to
real political bases that will support them.
When the above ideas emerged from the pen of
Montesquieu they may have had a medieval
aspect, with their three estates and the guilds,
but the democratic institutions of Europe came
from precisely these roots. They first emerged
there in a time when the larger number of the
population were peasants. Perhaps they
therefore also are a ‘fit’ for Tropical African
states, where most of the citizenry also are
peasants. Such institutions cannot replace
electoral democracy, but they can lead to liberty
whether full democracy exists or not.
5 Conclusions: liberty as a path to democracy
and conflict resolution 
Where should democratisation stand among the
priority tasks for reconstructing human security
and order in African states emerging from
violent domestic conflict? Elections cannot be
avoided, for they virtually always are demanded
by elites and ordinary citizens alike, are central
to legitimating new governments, and affirm the
popular principles (sometimes in the face of
reality) that government is a civilian (rather
than military) responsibility and is accountable
to the citizenry. 
But when elections are conducted without the
support of other democratic institutions they can
provoke violent conflict rather than offering an
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alternative to it. Donors and the United Nations
have had to devote considerable resources to
elections in states undergoing reconstruction –
and even those have not always been ‘free and
fair’. Among the institutions that can support
democracy, however, are those that deliver
‘liberty’ – a genuinely independent judiciary and
other countervailing powers to the presidency
(which make winning it less desperate and
provide a venue for contesting election
irregularities). Liberty has its own benefits, even
in the absence of full democracy. For example,
we know that the arbitrary and capricious
administration of the law interferes with
economic growth (North 1990).
In reconstructing post-conflict states more
attention needs to be paid to the social contracts
which provide governance and order at the base
of the political system and to resolving local level
disputes over land and water (Straus 2012).
Multiparty elections also can reignite national
conflicts which they ought to help resolve if they
are not conducted in an appropriate institutional
context. And multiple bases of authority help
with these challenges as well. 
It is more feasible to see the challenge of post-
conflict reconstruction as one of creating real
checks on ‘imperial presidents’ than one of
breaking patrimonialism and creating ‘free and
fair’ electoral contests between competing
political parties, particularly when the results are
‘winner take all’. Patronage and ethnically based
electoral competition are both still deeply rooted
in Tropical African societies. But as we noted
above, the social, economic and international
bases of local elites have diversified and
strengthened changes in Africa over the last
quarter of a century in ways that make the
survival of the institutions of liberty more likely if
they can first be given constitutional authority
and donor support. At independence new rulers
fairly easily got the voter support needed to
sweep aside constitutions that restricted their
power. However, as is illustrated by the electoral
defeats in the last decade of President Wade in
Senegal and President Kibaki in Kenya when
they proposed constitutions more advantageous
to themselves, citizens in many countries on the
continent are now more discerning. Not only
might prime ministers and bicameral legislatures
now survive and provide checking roles, but
electoral commissions are gradually gaining in
independence and new, constitutionally
entrenched bodies that protect key components
of democracy have been created in some
countries, where they are beginning to show
influence. At the moment more of the energy and
resources of the international community go to
the mechanics of making post-conflict elections
‘free and fair’ than go to the creation and
consolidation of the institutions of liberty – from
the judiciary, through local governments, senates
and independent commissions. The order of those
priorities needs to be reversed.
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Notes
* I am grateful to Robin Luckham, Anna
Schmidt and Scott Straus for comments they
made on an earlier version of this article.
1 The following 12 paragraphs are based on
Leonard (2010). They are reprinted with the
permission of the publisher.
2 Bates does find that multiparty systems are
more likely to create challenges to order but the
effects of elections to the contrary are stronger.
3 The next nine paragraphs are based on
Leonard (2009b). They are used here by
permission of the Electoral Institute for
Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), the
publisher.
4 The fact that patronage works best when it is
a ‘private good’ or a community (‘club’) one
and the damage this does to the larger ‘public
goods’ component of most valuable public
policy is well analysed in Bates (1981).
5 Montesquieu’s full name was Charles Louis de
Secondat, Baron of Brède and de Montesquieu. 
6 The opinion in September 2004 of the guide
at the Château de la Brède.
7 The view of John Maynard Keynes as reported
in Juppe (1999).
8 Montesquieu foresaw this consequence of
European colonialism when he wrote that ‘A
republic that conquers another state can
scarcely communicate its form of government
to it and govern the conquered according to
its own constitution’.
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